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Abstract: The question how Darwinian mechanisms lead to the evolution of individually costly cooperative behavior has 
given rise to a number of hypotheses. However, attempts to build a synthesis where different types of mechanisms coexist 
and interact at different levels of selections are still scarce. Here we derive simple game theoretical models where the 
group level conflicts are resolved by group selection while simultaneously within group competition is resolved by kin 
selection and reciprocity. We show that none of the mechanisms, when alone, is as robust in evolving and maintaining 
cooperation as a synthesis of all. Furthermore, we show that initially within group conflicts can be overcome only by kin 
selection and not reciprocity. However, once common, different types of reciprocities can maintain high levels of 
cooperation even if average relatedness among individuals is lowered, groups become large, and the benefits of 
cooperation are reduced. Based on the synthesis we also propose a possible route to the evolution of social and eusocial 
systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Evolution of cooperation in the Darwinian struggle for 
existence is an enduring evolutionary conundrum and a 
number of solutions are proposed. While the numbers of 
possible solutions are overwhelming, we can identify two 
schools of thoughts where the difference lies in whether a 
group or an individual is the unit of selection. Group 
selection theory predicts that group beneficial traits will 
evolve due to competition between groups [1]. However, it 
falls short when explaining how such traits will be main-
tained when within group individual level selection does not 
favor their evolution [2, 3]. Several theories have been 
proposed to resolve this problem of individual level 
selection, of which two of the most celebrated theories are 
kin selection and reciprocity. If the cost to benefit ratio is 
smaller than the average relatedness between individuals 
then kin selection can favor evolution of cooperation [4], 
while, among the unrelated individuals, cooperation can 
evolve through reciprocity [5] where individuals cooperate 
with those who have cooperated with them before (direct 
reciprocity) [6], or cooperate with reputed cooperators 
(indirect reciprocity) [7] or evolve cooperation by punishing 
the defectors (strong reciprocity) [8, 9]. 
 Kin selection theory has been the subject of heated 
debate in the past few years with studies both supporting and 
criticizing its applicability in the evolution of cooperation. It 
is suggested that the tradeoff between direct and indirect 
gains and competition between kin can disrupt kin-based 
cooperation [10]. A major debate was started by Wilson [11] 
and Wilson and Hölldobler, [12] who said that kin selection  
 
 
*Address correspondence to this author at the Indian Institute of Science 
Education and Research, Sai Trinity, Central Tower, Garware Circle, Pune 
411021, India; E-mail: neeleshdahanukar@rediffmail.com 
is not a key to altruism in social insects. Rather, group 
selection could have been the driving force behind evolution 
of cooperation, so that genetic relatedness is just a 
consequence of the phenomenon. Foster et al. [13] strongly 
criticized this claim. Flecher et al. [14] pleaded for the 
importance of reciprocity over kin selection, which was 
again counter attacked by Foster et al. [15], leaving the 
debate far from resolved. There has also been an attempt to 
show that both kin selection and group selection work on the 
same principle [16]. 
 We believe that while all the suggestions are valid, 
favoring one theory over another may not give us a clue on 
the evolution of cooperation in natural environments. In 
nature it is likely that several different mechanisms work at 
the same time to bolster cooperative organizations. What we 
need, therefore, is a synthesis in which several mechanisms 
of evolution of cooperation coexist at the same time. There 
have been some attempts in this respect. Lehmann and Keller 
[17] give a general framework for the evolution of 
cooperation by incorporating several mechanisms in a single 
equation and show how the different models of cooperation 
are special cases of this equation. Meanwhile Marshall and 
Rowe [18] and Fletcher and Zwick [19] synthesized models 
that incorporate both kin selection and direct reciprocity to 
study the interactions between the two mechanisms and 
understand the basic principles underlying these mechanisms 
respectively. Even though these models attempt to unify the 
concepts and understand how different mechanisms interact 
with each other, they have given little attention to two 
important behaviors: namely punishment and discrimination 
(individual recognition and memory over time by others in 
the interacting group). Our study differs from other studies in 
three respects. Firstly, we build simple game theoretical 
matrix models by incorporating group selection, kin 
selection and different types of reciprocity and study the 
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conditions that favor evolution of cooperation in a popu-
lation of defectors and the conditions that maintain coope-
ration when it is common. Secondly, based on our findings 
we propose a possible route to the co-evolution of strategies 
for cooperation and social systems. Third, by integrating 
dyadic interaction with group behavior, we show the role of 
individual recognition and social signaling, making it 
possible to recruit allies to punish defectors either by other 
members of an individual’s kin, or by collective behaviors of 
a group (of which ostracism plays a hitherto largely unnoted 
role) [20].  
 In this study we derive simple game theoretical models 
incorporating kin selection, group selection and different 
types of reciprocities. We show that group selection with 
individual level conflict resolved by kin selection evolves 
more robust cooperative organization than either of the 
mechanisms alone. Further, we show that reciprocity cannot 
evolve cooperation in a population of defectors; but if the 
degree of relatedness is more than the cost to benefit ratio, 
kin selection can reinforce cooperation which-once it’s 
common-can be maintained by direct, indirect, or strong 
reciprocity even when average relatedness is lowered. Thus 
group selection and reciprocity among kin is robust to 
variability in gains from cooperative act. Based on our 
findings we propose possible route to the evolution of social 
and eusocial systems. We also substantiate our proposals 
using empirical evidence. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 Prisoner’s dilemma is used as a major paradigm to study 
the evolution of cooperation. In a two person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) game both players have two behavioral 
options, either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). Let ‘b’ be 
the benefit of a cooperative act and ‘c’ be the cost of 
cooperation such that b > c > 0. In a PD interaction the 
benefit of a cooperative act is only to the opponent while the 
cooperator pays the cost of cooperation. Thus, if both the 
players cooperate mutually then both achieve the payoff b-c, 
while if both defect both get nothing. If one player 
cooperates while the other defects then the cooperator gets -c 
and the defector gets b. This can be put in a matrix form as 
follows. 
 
C D
C b?c ?c
D b 0
 (1) 
 As defection always pays better, irrespective of the 
behavioral choice of the opponent, defection is commonly 
viewed as the only evolutionary stable Nash Equilibrium in 
this game. While this is true for two isolated individuals in a 
single interaction, repeated interactions and the presence of 
an observer who can identify and remember the defector and 
exclude those engaging in defection (a frequent characteristic 
in animal groups and ubiquitous among humans due to the 
evolution of language and naming of both individuals and 
kin groups) can convert the standard PD into a cooperative 
game. As a result, models of cooperation differ greatly once 
individual behavioral responses are integrated with the likely 
behaviors of members of a group in species with individual 
recognition and memory (as is found in many primates and 
in humans). We will incorporate these complexities in the 
basic model in a stepwise manner. 
Kin Selection in Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 Starting with the standard model of an interaction 
between two isolated individuals without an observer, we 
model kin selection in the PD game as follows. If the 
average relatedness between individuals is r then the gains 
and losses of the opponent are shared by the focal individual 
with the fraction r [21-23]. The resultant payoff matrix is  
 
C D
C (b?c)(1+ r) rb?c
D b? rc 0
 (2) 
 We call this model as the ‘relatedness coefficient model’ 
where we consider a linear weighting approach. Even though 
we have used this approach in the next six sections we will 
also consider another model where we will treat r as a 
positive assortment probability leading to a non-linear 
weighting approach.  
 We will analyze the model for stability of cooperation 
and invasion of defection. If E(X|Y) is the payoff of a person 
adopting strategy X when in a population using strategy Y, 
then cooperation will be ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) 
[24], if E(C|C) > E (D|C) while cooperators can invade a 
population of defectors if E (C|D) > E (D|D). In the presence 
of kin selection cooperation will be stable and can invade a 
population of defectors in the PD game if 
 
r > c b  (Table 1). 
Group Selection among Kin 
 One extension of group selection model has been 
presented by Nowak [23], who reduces the evolutionary 
dynamics of individual level selection within the group and 
group level selection between groups to a single two-person 
game on one level of selection. Consider a population which 
is subdivided into m groups. The maximum size of a group is 
n. Individuals in the same group interact with each other 
through Prisoner’s Dilemma game given by the payoff 
matrix (1). We begin with the standard “one-shot” two-
person PD without an observer, whose actors lack all 
memory that will influence behavior in any possible future 
interaction that is mutually beneficial. At each time step, an 
individual from the entire population is chosen for repro-
duction proportional to its inclusive fitness (i.e., potential to 
increase the transmission of “genes identical by descent”-and 
hence including the survival and reproduction of close kin). 
In this two-person model, offspring are added to the same 
group (i.e., all mating is endogamous).  
 Between groups there is no game dynamical interaction, 
but groups divide at rates that are proportional to the average 
fitness of individuals in that group. (Note this means the 
model excludes exogamous mating between local bands or 
members of different clans in a pre-literate tribe or 
segmentary lineage system; once these complexities of 
human kinship made possible by language and memory, as 
we will show, it is necessary to integrate the levels of 
analysis as we propose). In the model restricted to single, 
entirely endogamous groups, one can say that cooperator 
groups have a constant payoff b-c, while defector groups 
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have a constant payoff 0. Hence, in a sense between groups 
the game can take the form as follows, 
 
C D
C (b?c) (b?c)
D 0 0
 (3) 
 We can now multiply the matrix (1) by the group size, n, 
and the matrix (3) by the number of groups, m, and add the 
two matrices. The result is, 
 
C D
C (b?c)n + (b?c)m ?cn + (b?c)m
D bn 0
 (4) 
 Cooperation will be stable if E(C|C) > E (D|C) and 
cooperators will invade defectors if E(C|D) > E (D|D). Both 
these conditions are satisfied when 
 
m n > c (b?c)  [23].  
 We will now consider that genetically related individuals 
coalesce in the same group and interact with each other 
through Prisoner’s Dilemma game given by the payoff 
Table 1. Payoff Matrices and Conditions for Maintenance of Cooperation and Invasion for Defectors in Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Played between Kin 
 
Payoff Matrix 
Condition for Maintaining 
Cooperation 
Condition for 
Invading Defectors 
Kin selection 
 
C D
C (b?c)(1+ r) rb?c
D b? rc 0
 
 
r >
c
b
 
 
r >
c
b
 
Group selection + Kin selection 
 
C D
C (b?c)(1+ r)n + (b?c)m (rb?c)n + (b?c)m
D (b? rc)n 0
 
 
r >
c
b
? (b?c)
b
m
n
 
 
r >
c
b
? (b?c)
b
m
n
 
Direct reciprocity + Kin selection 
 
TFT D
TFT
(b?c)(1+ r)
1?? rb?c
D b? rc 0
 
 
r >
c??b
b??c   
r >
c
b
 
Indirect reciprocity + Kin selection 
 
Disc D
Disc (b?c)(1+ r) (rb?c)(1?q)
D (b? rc)(1?q) 0
 
 
r >
c?qb
b?qc  
 
r >
c
b
 
Direct reciprocity + Indirect reciprocity + Kin selection 
 
DRIR D
DRIR
(b?c)(1+ r)
1?? (rb?c)(1?q)
D (b? rc)(1?q) 0
 
 
r >
c??b?qb(1??)
b??c?qc(1??)  
 
r >
c
b
 
Strong reciprocity + Kin selection 
 
PBDT D
PBDT
(b?c)(1+ r)
1?? (rb?c) +
?(rb?c? ry? x)
1??
D (b? rc) + ?(b? rc? y? rx)
1?? 0
 
 
r >
c?? y
b +?x  
 
r >
c +?x
b?? y  
Strong reciprocity + Indirect reciprocity + Kin selection 
 
SRIR D
SRIR
(b?c)(1+ r)
1?? (rb?c?qry?qx) +
?(rb?c? ry? x)
1??
D (b? rc?qy?qrx) + ?(b? rc? y? rx)
1?? 0
 
 
r >
c?? y?qy(1??)
b +?x + qx(1??)  
 
r >
c +?x + qx(1??)
b?? y?qy(1??)  
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matrix (2). If the average relatedness between individuals of 
two different groups is negligibly small (as occurs without 
exogamy) then the payoff matrix (3) that describes the 
payoff between groups will not change. Now, we can 
multiply matrix (2) by the group size, n, and the matrix (3) 
by the number of groups, m, and add the two matrices. The 
result is, 
 
C D
C (b?c)(1+ r)n + (b?c)m (rb?c)n + (b?c)m
D (b? rc)n 0
 (5) 
 Cooperation will be stable if E(C|C) > E (D|C) and 
cooperators will invade defectors if E(C|D) > E (D|D). Both 
these conditions are satisfied when 
 
m n > (c? rb) (b?c) . 
In terms of r the equation can be rearranged as 
 
r >
c
b
? (b?c)
b
m
n
. 
 In the absence of kin selection, group selection can 
evolve cooperation and maintain it if 
 
m
n
>
c
b?c  [23]. In the 
presence of kin selection, the condition for the evolution and 
maintenance of cooperation is 
 
m
n
>
c? rb
b?c . The equation 
depicts that as the relatedness between individuals increases 
the threshold value of m/n will decrease, indicating that kin 
selection can evolve and maintain cooperation within groups 
when groups are large and the number of groups is small. 
Thus, group selection works better with kin selection than 
alone for interacting individuals with any r > 0. Furthermore, 
the threshold value of relatedness required in the presence of 
both kin selection and group selection is 
 
r >
c
b
? (b?c)
b
m
n
. 
Thus, kin selection works well in the presence of group 
selection than alone for any b > c. Hence, group and kin 
selection together can evolve robust cooperation than either 
of them working alone, especially when average relatedness 
is low, groups are large and the number of groups is small.  
 A plot of threshold value of relatedness required to 
evolve and maintain cooperation with variable b, n and m 
values is shown in Fig. (1), which depicts that small group 
sizes favor cooperation at low relatedness even when 
benefits from cooperative act are small. This explains why 
nonhuman primates and preliterate human tribes normally 
form small hunter-gatherer bands. When the group size 
increases, cooperation is favored only if the number of 
competing groups is large (as occurs among mammals 
forming herds whose size creates limitations to the total 
population sustainable in a specific location). 
 While we begin with this model, showing how it leads to 
the need to combine group selection and the individual’s 
cost-benefit calculus, we then add the implications of an 
observer who can communicate the outcome of a single PD 
interaction to other members of the group with whom the 
 
Fig. (1). Effect of group size (n) and benefit of cooperation (b) on the threshold relatedness (r) required to evolve cooperation for different 
number of groups (m) when cooperators use both direct and indirect reciprocity. (A) m = 5, (B) m = 10, (C) m = 25 and (D) m = 100. Cost of 
cooperation (c) is 0.3. 
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defector will necessarily interact in the future. In this new 
model, combining individual recognition with memory 
shows how the kinship between the cooperator and the 
observer combined with prediction of future social inter-
action transforms even a single-shot PD. 
Direct Reciprocity among Kin 
 At the individual level, we will now consider that 
individuals use direct reciprocity with their kin. One of the 
simplest strategies of direct reciprocity is Tit-For-Tat (TFT) 
where the player cooperates in the first move and then 
onwards repeats the same strategy as the opponent’s 
previous move [6]. We will consider that all the cooperators 
are using TFT strategy. Let ? n-1 be the probability that nth 
interaction with the same opponent really occurs (a 
probability greatly increased by the enhanced memory and 
cognition found in great apes and especially humans). Two 
TFT players will cooperate in all the interactions so, 
 
E(TFT | TFT ) = (b?c) +?(b?c)
+?2(b?c) +?3(b?c) + ..... = b?c
1??
 
 However, when in contest with the D player, TFT player 
will cooperate in the first interaction but will defect in the 
subsequent interactions, so 
 
E(TFT | D) = (?c) +?(0) +?2(0) +?3(0) + ..... =?c  
 While, the defector will get, 
 
E(D | TFT ) = (b) +?(0) +?2(0) +?3(0) + ..... = b  
 Two D players will always defect, so  
 
E(D | D) = (0) +?(0) +?2(0) +?3(0) + ..... = 0  
 Thus the payoff matrix between a cooperator using TFT 
strategy and a defector will be given as,  
 
TFT D
TFT
(b?c)
1?? ?c
D b 0
 (6) 
 TFT will be stable against defectors when E (TFT|TFT) > 
E (D|TFT), i.e. when 
 
?> c b . However, TFT players 
cannot invade a population of defectors as E (D|D) > E 
(TFT|D) for any c > 0. If mechanisms of individual 
recognition, identification of kin, and memory are present (as 
in humans), this means that TFT is likely to generate group 
selection due to differential signaling for members of a local 
group as compared to outsiders. (Evolved traits, such as 
suspicion of outsiders whose phenotypical traits are unfami-
liar, probably reflect this linkage between TFT and group 
selection). 
 Now consider that the interactions are among relatives 
then,  
 
E(TFT | TFT ) = (b?c)(1+ r) +?(b?c)(1+ r)
+?2(b?c)(1+ r) + ..... = (b?c)(1+ r)
1??
 
 
E(TFT | D) = (rb?c) +?(0) +?2(0)
+?3(0) + ..... = rb?c
 
 
E(D | TFT ) = (b? rc) +?(0) +?2(0)
+?3(0) + ..... = b? rc
 
 
E(D | D) = (0) +?(0) +?2(0) +?3(0) + ..... = 0  
 Thus the payoff matrix takes the form, 
 
TFT D
TFT
(b?c)(1+ r)
1?? rb?c
D b? rc 0
 (7) 
 Here, TFT will be stable against defectors when E 
(TFT|TFT) > E (D|TFT), i.e. when 
 
r >
c??  b
b??  c  and TFT 
players will invade a population of defectors when E 
(TFT|D) > E (D|D) ie., when 
 
r > c b . Thus, as the 
probability that the two players meet again increases, 
cooperation can be maintained even when the relatedness 
among individuals is low. Once again, this prediction will be 
strengthened by reliable identification and memory of both 
kinship and group membership. 
 The threshold value of relatedness above which coope-
ration is stable for different values of benefit of cooperation 
(b) and probability of meeting again (?) is given in Fig. (2).  
 
 
Fig. (2). Effect of probability of meeting the same person again (?) 
and benefit of cooperation (b) on the threshold relatedness (r) 
required for maintaining cooperation when cooperators use TFT 
strategy. Cost of cooperation (c) is 0.3. 
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The figure depicts that when probability of meeting the same 
opponent is high, cooperation can evolve even at low 
relatedness and small benefit of cooperation. However, TFT 
will invade the population of defectors only if 
 
r > c b , 
indicating that cooperators can invade defectors only through 
kin selection and direct reciprocity by itself cannot evolve 
cooperation.  
Indirect Reciprocity among Kin 
 Indirect reciprocity is a form of reciprocity where coope-
rators build reputation and discriminators in the population 
cooperate only with the reputed cooperators [7]. This type of 
reciprocity does not depend upon the probability of meeting 
the same player again, but it works only if there are 
discriminators who can discriminate between the cooperators 
and defectors. We will consider indirect reciprocity model 
similar to Nowak and Sigmund [7] where cooperation 
increases ones own reputation, while defection reduces it. If 
there are discriminating individuals in the population who 
discriminate between individuals having good reputation and 
bad reputation and cooperate only with the players having 
good reputation, then cooperation can evolve through 
indirect reciprocity. We will consider that all the cooperators 
exist as discriminators (Disc). Let q be the probability that a 
discriminator can discriminate between good and bad 
reputed individuals (0 ? q ? 1), then the payoff matrix 
between discriminators and defectors can be derived as 
follows. Two discriminators will always cooperate with each 
other and with a defector with a probability 1-q. Thus,  
 
Disc D
Disc (b?c) ?c(1?q)
D b(1?q) 0
 (8) 
 Here, cooperation will be stable if E (Disc|Disc) > E 
(D|Disc), ie. when 
 
q > c b . However, cooperators cannot 
invade defectors because E (D|D) > E (Disc|D) for any c > 0 
and q < 1. 
 Now let us consider indirect reciprocity between rela-
tives. A discriminator will cooperate with the defector with 
probability 1-q and the gains and losses of both the indivi-
duals will be shared with each other proportional to the 
average relatedness between them. Thus,  
 
Disc D
Disc (b?c)(1+ r) (rb?c)(1?q)
D (b? rc)(1?q) 0
 (9) 
 Cooperation based on discrimination strategy will be 
stable if E (Disc|Disc) > E (D|Disc), ie. when 
 
r >
c?qb
b?qc , 
while cooperators will invade a population of defectors if E 
(Disc|D) > E (D|D), ie. when 
 
r > c b . These conditions are 
similar to the conditions achieved for direct reciprocity 
where q is replaced by ?. Thus, if the probability of 
discrimination is more, cooperation can be maintained 
through indirect reciprocity even when relatedness and gains 
from cooperation are low. However, discrimination itself 
cannot evolve cooperation and cooperation can evolve only 
through kin selection. 
Direct and Indirect Reciprocity among Kin 
 A major drawback of direct reciprocity by TFT strategy 
is that in the absence of human linguistic and cultural 
symbols of kinship and memory discussed above, it always 
cooperates with the opponent in the first round. This could 
be a major loss if the opponent is a defector. In such a 
condition, knowing the strategy of the opponent by 
discrimination can always be beneficial. If a TFT player can 
discriminate between the cooperator and a defector, it will 
avoid being exploited even in the first move. We can thus 
merge direct and indirect reciprocity and come up with a 
strategy DRIR which will discriminate and cooperate with 
only cooperators. Similar to the derivation of payoff matrix 
for direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity among kin we 
can derive the payoff matrix for DRIR strategy among kin 
as, 
 
E(DRIR | DRIR) = (b?c)(1+ r) +?(b?c)(1+ r)
+?2(b?c)(1+ r) + ..... = (b?c)(1+ r)
1??
 
 
E(DRIR | D) = (rb?c)(1?q) +?(0) +?2(0)
+?3(0) + ..... = (rb?c)(1?q)
 
 
E(D | DRIR) = (b? rc)(1?q) +?(0) +?2(0)
+?3(0) + ..... = (b? rc)(1?q)
 
 
E(D | D) = (0) +?(0) +?2(0) +?3(0) + ..... = 0  
 In the matrix form, 
 
DRIR D
DRIR
(b?c)(1+ r)
1?? (rb?c)(1?q)
D (b? rc)(1?q) 0
 (10) 
 Here, DRIR will maintain cooperation in the population 
if E (DRIR|DRIR) > E (D|DRIR), i.e. when 
 
r >
c??  b?qb(1??)
b??  c?qc(1??) , indicating that both ? and q can 
decrease the threshold relatedness for any b > c.  
 Effect of ?, q and b on the threshold value of r required 
to evolve cooperation using DRIR strategy is shown in Fig. 
(3). The figure depicts that direct and indirect reciprocity 
among kin can be a very robust means of maintaining 
cooperation even when the benefit of cooperation is small. 
However, it will invade the population of defectors only if E 
(DRIR|D) > E (D|D), i.e. when 
 
r > c b  suggesting that only 
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kin selection can evolve cooperation from a population of 
defectors.  
Strong Reciprocity Among Kin 
 Recent studies advocate that cooperation can be main-
tained if cooperators punish defectors. Because punishment 
itself is costly this prosocial form of reciprocity is called as 
strong reciprocity [8, 9]. In two person repeated PD 
interactions strong reciprocity can take the form of Punish-
But-Don’t-Tit (PBDT) strategy [25, 26]. In a PBDT strategy, 
the player cooperates in the first move and from the second 
move cooperates with or without punishment depending on 
the opponent’s strategy in the previous move. If the 
opponent cooperated in the previous move then PBDT plays 
cooperation without punishment. However, if the opponent 
has defected in the previous move then the PBDT plays 
cooperation with punishment. The cost of punishment is x to 
the PBDT player and the punished defector plays y (where y 
> x > 0 and b-y < -c-x). Let ? be the probability that same 
two players will interact again. Two PBDT players will 
cooperate in all the interactions so, 
 
E(PBDT | PBDT ) = (b?c) +?(b?c)
+?2(b?c) +?3(b?c) + ..... = b?c
1??
 
 However, when in contest with the D player, PBDT 
player will cooperate without punishment in the first 
interaction but will cooperate with punishment in the 
subsequent interactions, so, 
 
E(PBDT | D) = (?c) +?(?c? x) +?2(?c? x)
+?3(?c? x) + ..... =?c + ?(?c? x)
1??
 
 While, the defector will get, 
 
E(D | PBDT ) = (b) +?(b? y) +?2(b? y)
+?3(b? y) + ..... = b + ?(b? y)
1??
 
 Thus the payoff matrix can be given as, 
 
PBDT D
PBDT
(b?c)
1?? ?c +
?(?c? x)
1??
D b +
?(b? y)
1?? 0
 (11) 
 PBDT will be stable against defectors when E 
(PBDT|PBDT) > E (D|PBDT), i.e. when 
 
?> c y . 
However, PBDT players cannot invade a population of 
defectors as E (D|D) > E (PBDT|D) for any c > 0 and x > 0 
(except that members in different local groups who belong to 
the same clan have a potential resource of kin allies who 
change the expected pay-off and thus deter defectors). 
 Now consider that the interactions are among individuals 
with some degree of kinship, for then the penalty of the 
 
Fig. (3). Effect of probability of meeting the same person again (?) and benefit of cooperation (b) on the threshold relatedness (r) required 
for maintaining cooperation for different values of probability of knowing other persons strategy (q) when cooperators use both direct and 
indirect reciprocity. (A) q = 0.2, (B) q = 0.4, (C) q = 0.6 and (D) q = 0.8. Cost of cooperation (c) is 0.3. 
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punishment and cost of punishment will also be shared by 
both the players proportional to degree of relatedness. Thus, 
 
E(PBDT | PBDT ) = (b?c)(1+ r) +?(b?c)(1+ r)
+?2(b?c)(1+ r) + ..... = (b?c)(1+ r)
1??
 
 
E(PBDT | D) = (rb?c) +?(rb?c? ry? x)
+ ..... = (rb?c) + ?(rb?c? ry? x)
1??
 
 
E(D | PBDT ) = (b? rc) +?(b? rc? y? rx)
+ ..... = (b? rc) + ?(b? rc? y? rx)
1??
 
 Thus the payoff matrix takes the form (Eq. 12). 
 PBDT will be stable against defectors when E 
(PBDT|PBDT) > E (D|PBDT), i.e. when 
 
r >
c??  y
b +?  x . Thus, 
punishment can reduce the threshold relatedness even when 
punishment is costly to the punisher so long as y > 0 and ? > 
0.  
 Fig. (4) shows the threshold value of relatedness for 
different values of ? and b. PBDT can maintain cooperation 
when both benefit of cooperation and probability of meeting 
the same opponent is small. PBDT is far better than TFT in 
maintaining cooperation when benefit of cooperation is 
small (Figs. 2 and 4). However, PBDT can invade the 
population of defectors only if 
 
r >
c +?  x
b??  y . This condition 
implies that punishment is not a good mechanism to evolve 
cooperation as the relatedness required will be even more 
than kin selection working alone for any y > x > 0. Thus, we 
cannot rely on strong reciprocity to evolve cooperation 
among defectors.  
Strong and Indirect Reciprocity Among Kin 
 Similar to direct reciprocity, a major drawback of strong 
reciprocity by PBDT strategy is that it always cooperates 
without punishment with the opponent in the first round and 
will suffer costs unless there are group selected norms like 
those just described. In such a condition, knowing the 
strategy of the opponent by discrimination can always be a 
benefit as the PBDT strategy can punish the known defector 
even in the first round. If a player uses strategy involving 
both strong and indirect reciprocity (SRIR) then the payoff 
matrix can be derived as follows.  
 
E(SRIR | SRIR) = (b?c)(1+ r) +?(b?c)(1+ r)
+?2(b?c)(1+ r) + ..... = (b?c)(1+ r)
1??
 
 
E(SRIR | D) = (1?q)(rb?c) + q(rb?c? ry? x)??? ???
+?(rb?c? ry? x) + .....
= (b? rc?qy?qrx) + ?(b? rc? y? rx)
1??
 
 
E(D | SRIR) = (1?q)(b? rc) + q(b? rc? y? rx)??? ???
+?(b? rc? y? rx) + .....
= (rb?c?qry?qx) + ?(rb?c? ry? x)
1??
 
 
Fig. (4). Effect of probability of meeting the same person again (?) and benefit of cooperation (b) on the threshold relatedness (r) required 
for maintaining cooperation when cooperators use PBDT strategy. Cost of cooperation (c) is 0.3, cost of punishing (x) is 0.1 and penalty of 
punishment (y) is 0.7. 
 
 
PBDT D
PBDT
(b?c)(1+ r)
1?? (rb?c) +
?(rb?c? ry? x)
1??
D (b? rc) + ?(b? rc? y? rx)
1?? 0
 (12) 
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 In the matrix form (Eq. 13).  
 SRIR will be stable against defectors when E 
(SRIR|SRIR) > E (D|SRIR), i.e. when 
 
r >
c??  y?qy(1??)
b +?  x + qx(1??)  Thus, SRIR can be a very effective 
strategy to main cooperation even when punishment is costly 
so long as players can discriminate between cooperators and 
defectors, play repeated interactions and penalty of punish-
ment y > 0.  
 Effect of ?, q and b on the threshold value of r required 
to evolve cooperation using SRIR strategy is shown in Fig. 
(5). Strong and indirect reciprocity among kin can be a very 
robust means, better than DRIR strategy, of maintaining co-
operation when the benefit of cooperation is small. However, 
SRIR will invade the population of defectors only if 
 
r >
c +?  x + qx(1??)
b??  y?qy(1??)  which is worse than any other 
strategy. 
Kin Selection as Positive Assortment Probability 
 Till now, at the individual level, we considered that ‘r’ is 
the relatedness coefficient and a focal individual shares the 
loss and benefit of the kin with this probability. Another way 
of viewing ‘r’ is as a positive assortment probability [27]. In 
this case, two individuals will recognize each other as kin 
with a probability r and cooperate. But in the absence of 
such recognition (1-r), players will interact randomly and 
meet cooperators with their population frequency p and 
defectors with their population frequency 1-p. Then the 
payoff of unconditional cooperator and defector will be 
respectively, 
 
EC = r b?c( )+ 1? r( ) p b?c( )+ 1? p( ) ?c( )??? ???  
 
ED = 1? r( ) pb  
 Cooperation will evolve if EC > ED or 
 
r > c b . Thus, the 
condition for the evolution of cooperation via kin selection 
considering r as a relatedness coefficient or positive assort-
 
SRIR D
SRIR
(b?c)(1+ r)
1?? (rb?c?qry?qx) +
?(rb?c? ry? x)
1??
D (b? rc?qy?qrx) + ?(b? rc? y? rx)
1?? 0
 (13) 
 
Fig. (5). Effect of probability of meeting the same person again (?) and benefit of cooperation (b) on the threshold relatedness (r) required 
for maintaining cooperation for different values of probability of knowing other persons strategy (q) when cooperators use both strong and 
indirect reciprocity. (A) q = 0.1, (B) q = 0.2, (C) q = 0.3 and (D) q = 0.4. Cost of cooperation (c) is 0.3, cost of punishing (x) is 0.1 and 
penalty of punishment (y) is 0.7. 
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ment probability yields the same result. However, the 
conditions for evolution of cooperation and its maintenance 
with reciprocity among kin are different (Table 2). Com-
parison of the conditions for maintenance of cooperation and 
invasion of defectors for the two models reveal two 
interesting differences. First, in the case of strategies that 
rely on future interactions with the same opponent (TFT, 
DRIR, PBDT and SRIR) the condition for the invasion of 
defectors are dependent on the probability of the same two 
players meeting again (?) in the case of positive assortment 
model, however, TFT and DRIR are independent of ? in the 
case of relatedness coefficient model. Second, r required for 
the invasion of defectors in the positive assortment model is 
smaller than the relatedness coefficient model in the case of 
direct reciprocity (TFT), indirect reciprocity (Disc) and 
DRIR strategies.  
 The positive assortment model, however, suffers from 
one important problem. We will illustrate the problem by 
considering direct reciprocity among kin. A game between 
the TFT and D players will take the form of matrix (6). In 
the conventional approach to this game there are two pure 
strategy Nash Equilibriums, one at (D,D) and second at 
(TFT,TFT). Both these equilibriums are stable and one of 
them will be achieved in the population based on the initial 
frequency of the strategies. There is also a mixed strategy 
Nash Equilibrium which is unstable. A population of TFT 
players is stable against invasion by defectors. However, in a 
population of defectors, TFT cannot invade since E(D|D) > 
E(TFT|D), as 0 > -c for any value of probability of 
interaction with the same opponent (?). Thus, in the words 
of Axelrod and Hamilton [6], “D is evolutionary stable no 
matter what is the probability of interaction continuing”.  
 We will now consider direct reciprocity among kin. The 
invasion and stability criteria for direct reciprocity among 
kin by relatedness coefficient model and positive assortment 
model are given in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. The 
plots of these criteria (Fig. 6) suggest that the stability 
criteria do not differ qualitatively except for the fact that the 
relationship is non-linear in the case of positive assortment 
model while it is linear in the case of relatedness coefficient 
model. However there is a difference in the invasion criteria. 
The positive assortment model makes a prediction that if the 
probability of meeting the same person is unity (i.e. if the 
same two players interact infinitely) TFT can invade a 
population of D players even when positive assortment r is 
zero (Fig. 6B). We have already seen that this is not possible 
because D is evolutionary stable whatever the chances of 
interaction continuing. On the contrary, in the relatedness 
coefficient model invasion criteria is independent of the 
probability of meeting the same opponent again (Fig. 6A). 
This is intuitively clear since TFT as a sole invader will 
always meet defectors and will fail to invade at any value of 
?. It is therefore not at all surprising that ? does not appear 
in the invasion criteria when a sole TFT is invading a 
population of defectors. However, as soon as there is a 
sizable population of TFT, ? becomes an important determi-
nant. Thus, relatedness coefficient model suggests that initial 
invasion of D by TFT players can only rely on the related-
ness coefficient and TFT can invade only when 
 
r > c b . 
This is compatible with the assertion by Axelrod and 
Hamilton [6, pp. 1394].  
Table 2. Evolution, Maintenance and Invasion Criteria for Cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma Played Between Kin Where ‘r’ is 
the Positive Assortment Probability 
 
Assortment Probability for the Evolution of Cooperation 
Condition for Maintaining Cooperation 
(when p = 1) 
Condition for Invading Defectors 
(when p = 0) 
Direct reciprocity (TFT) 
 
r >
c?? c? pc + pb( )
b?? c? pc + pb( )
 
 
r >
c??b
b??b   
r >
c??c
b??c  
Indirect reciprocity (Disc) 
 
r >
c?q c? pc + pb( )
b?q c? pc + pb( )
 
 
r >
c?qb
b?qb  
 
r >
c?qc
b?qc  
Direct reciprocity + Indirect reciprocity (DRIR) 
 
r >
c? c?cp + bp( ) q +??q?( )
b? c?cp + bp( ) q +??q?( )
 
 
r >
c?b q +??q?( )
b?b q +??q?( )
 
 
r >
c?c q +??q?( )
b?c q +??q?( )
 
Strong reciprocity (PBDT) 
 
r >
c +? x? px? py( )
b +? x? px? py( )
 
 
r >
c? y?
b? y?  
 
r >
c +?x
b +?x  
Strong reciprocity + Indirect reciprocity (SRIR) 
 
r >
c + x? px? py( ) q +??q?( )
b + x? px? py( ) q +??q?( )
 
 
r >
c? y q +??q?( )
b? y q +??q?( )
 
 
r >
c + x q +??q?( )
b + x q +??q?( )
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DISCUSSION 
 In the light of the recent conflict over priorities and 
favoring one or few mechanisms of evolution of cooperation 
over others [11-15], our findings depict that a synthesis, 
where different mechanisms of evolution of cooperation 
coexist is far more robust to defection than any mechanism 
working alone. We have shown with simple game theoretical 
models that when group selection operates in between-group 
competition and kin selection works to resolve within-group 
conflicts, the resultant model is superior in evolving coope-
ration and maintaining it than any one strategy working 
alone. Furthermore, we showed that initially within group 
conflicts can be overcome only by kin selection and not 
reciprocity. However, once common, different types of reci-
procities can maintain cooperation at high levels even when 
average relatedness among individuals is small. Our analysis 
suggests that when different mechanisms of evolution of 
cooperation work together, cooperation can be maintained in 
the population even when the average relatedness is low, 
groups are large and the benefits of cooperation are low. 
 Two approaches are suggested for studying kin selection 
namely relatedness coefficient model and positive assort-
ment model. We tested both the models. Our analysis 
suggests that the stability criteria for different types of 
reciprocities do not differ much in both the models, however, 
the invasion criteria differ significantly. Nonetheless, taking 
direct reciprocity, using TFT strategy, as an example we 
showed that positive assortment model makes an impossible 
prediction about invasion of defector population. Positive 
assortment model suggests that TFT can invade a population 
of defectors, even when positive assortment probability is 
zero, given that the probability of meeting the same oppo-
nent is unity (Fig. 6B). This is not possible because defection 
is evolutionary stable irrespective of the probability of 
meeting the same opponent again [6]. On the contrary, 
relatedness coefficient model suggests that TFT can invade 
the population of defectors only through kin selection when 
 
r > c b  (Fig. 6A). Our analysis is not only in concurrence 
with the suggestions given by Axelrod and Hamilton [6] it 
also gives a mathematical basis for their argument. Our 
analysis also suggests that at least in the matrix games, the 
positive assortment approach should be used with caution.  
 There are two paths suggested for the evolution of social 
and eusocial systems. In the subsocial route societies origi-
nate from familial units initially composed of parents and 
offspring, while in the semisocial route societies originate 
through associations of individuals, related or unrelated, 
from the same generation [28]. Even though empirical 
evidence of kin selection in diverse group of organisms is 
overwhelming [29-35], many researchers have renounced 
subsocial route based on the fact that in a variety of societies 
the average relatedness is lower than expected [12, 36]. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that many social organiza-
tions also rely heavily on reciprocity [37, 38]. Anderson [39] 
has argued that “high genetic relatedness does not mean that 
kin selection is crucial for the evolution of eusocial systems 
rather reciprocity might have played a vial role, while high 
genetic relatedness can be just an outcome of evolution of 
eusociality”. On the contrary, our analysis strongly supports 
the subsocial route for the evolution of social systems.  
 We propose that social and eusocial systems initially 
probably evolved among closely related individuals. This  
is because our analysis shows that none of the proposed 
mechanisms of reciprocity can evolve cooperation in 
unrelated egoistic individuals unless reinforced by memory 
of previous interactions, discrimination and coercion. Addi-
tional direct evidence to our proposal comes from a recent 
study by Hughes et al. [40] who showed that monogamy is 
prevalent in the ancestral eusocial systems. Thus, the initial 
social systems were made up of subsocial groups consisting 
of close relatives like parents and offspring. At this stage 
both kin selection at the individual level and group selection 
at the group level might have played a pivotal role to give 
rise to social groups as we have shown that kin selection and 
group selection together can work far better than either of the 
strategies alone. Such subsocial groups might have been 
regularly threatened by intergroup conflicts, predation and 
parasitism. While it was possible to succeed in intergroup 
conflicts and reduce predation merely by increased group 
size, threat of parasitism necessitated the selection for gene-
tic heterogeneity. We suspect that intergroup conflict, threat 
due to predation or parasitism, and generation of collective 
common goods were responsible for the increase in the 
group size of social systems. 
 Increase in group size might have occurred in two 
different ways. In the case of organisms with high repro-
ductive rates, reproductive rate alone is sufficient to increase 
the group size. However, in the case of organisms with low 
reproductive rates, group merging might have played an 
important role. Interestingly such group merging for increa-
 
Fig. (6). Stability and invasion criteria for cooperation maintained by direct reciprocity among kin. (A) Based on the relatedness coefficient 
model (Table 1) and (B) based on positive assortment model (Table 2). Other parameters are b = 1 and c = 0.3. 
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sing the reproductive benefit is reported in social amoebae 
[41]. Group merging, however, would inevitably decrease 
the genetic relatedness among individuals. Decreased genetic 
relatedness and low individual benefits due to large group 
sizes might have led to the evolution of reciprocity, which is 
more efficient in maintaining cooperation in large groups.  
 In the case of organisms with high reproductive rates, 
two problems might have occurred. First, when genetic 
relatedness was high, competition between kin might have 
contributed to conflicts [42] which led to the evolution of 
different types of reciprocities [43]. Secondly, as group sizes 
started expanding, groups were forced to maintain genetic 
heterogeneity, owing to the threats of parasitism. At this 
stage kin selection would have been insufficient to maintain 
cooperation and different forms of reciprocities evolved to 
cope up with the scenario. Our proposed route for the 
evolution of social and eusocial systems is given in Fig. (7). 
 Once cooperation is common different forms of recipro-
cities can maintain cooperation even when genetic related-
ness is low. However, inability of reciprocity to invade 
defectors makes reciprocity an unlikely candidate for the 
early evolution of social systems. We therefore believe that 
social organizations evolved through subsocial route among 
genetically related individuals in small groups and different 
types of reciprocities evolved later to maintain cooperation 
when relatedness was lowered through group expansion and 
genetic heterogeneity. This process is especially effective 
when cooperation leads to changes in ecology that effec-
tively increase resources (as is illustrated among humans by 
the development of agriculture).  
 Various empirical findings support our view. Hughes et 
al. [40] showed that ancesters of eusocial wasps consisted of 
subsocial groups with close relatives like parents and 
offspring and kin selection could explain cooperation among 
the individuals. However, as pointed out by Ratnieks and 
Wenseleers [44] intermediate levels of relatedness found 
within modern-day insect societies are too low to directly 
cause the extreme levels of cooperation among individuals. 
Instead, their cooperation seems to be enforced by social 
sanctions in terms of punishment and policing by individuals 
[44, 45]. Thus with expansion of groups and increased 
genetic heterogeneity led to the increase in the coercion in 
insects and other vertebrates [44].  
 Another empirical evidence of collective punishment of a 
defector within group with close and distantly related kin 
comes from social system of Antarctic Penguins. The film 
 
Fig. (7). Possible route to the evolution of social and eusocial systems. 
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“March of the Penguins” (Warner Brothers Entertainment 
Inc., 2005) provided a visual record of Penguin social 
behavior in the species’ native habitat of Antarctica. Penguin 
females give birth to each year’s fledglings at the same time 
of year. All females in a local group huddle together-each 
with her fledgling in a pouch over their feet-to provide 
protection from the howling winds and cold temperature. If a 
fledgling falls out of its mother’s pouch and froze to death, 
after inspecting her dead fledgling, the mother approaches 
the huddled group of other Penguin mothers and attempt to 
steal a fledgling from its mother’s pouch. All of the females 
in the group immediately attacked the “defector” from the 
species-typical rules, beating her for the act of stealing the 
baby. In short, this film provides empirical evidence of a 
collective action to defend a collective interest.  
 Human social system, which has reached the pinnacle of 
cooperative behavior, also supports the predictions of our 
model. Firstly, it is now clear that humans have evolved 
mechanisms to detect kin [34, 46, 47]. Rushton [46, 47] has 
argued that humans have a tendency to recognize genetic 
similarity to give preferential treatment to kin. This behavior 
gives a biological substrate for ethnocentrism, enabling 
group selection to occur. Our journey to the modern nuclear 
families can be traced back to the hunter gatherers living in 
small clans and tribes. The marriage systems in several clans 
and tribes were influenced by kin networks [48, 49]. It is 
therefore possible that subsocial route had a complete or 
atleast a partial role in the primitive sociality. Social 
structures and leadership within the local residential group 
might have further reinforced the subsocial route. As 
ethologists and anthropologists have found, among other 
mammals whose groups are led by an alpha male, coope-
rative behavior among humans and great apes was greatly 
influenced by leader who was bonded with and supported by 
other males (some of whom were kin and whose support 
increases the leader’s reproductive success). As an example, 
Yanomamo clan in Venezuela, who typically had multiple 
wives to insure that every lineage in the clan had some 
offspring bearing the headman’s genes [49]. The leaders of 
many preliterate tribes (such as many Native American 
chieftains) had similarly greater than average mating oppor-
tunities, following customs that both enhanced the chief’s 
power to maintain control over the clan or tribe and 
integrated the tribe’s competing lineages.  
 Note, however, that the evolution of human language and 
naming system-by permitting vastly increased precision in 
the recognition of distant kin-served as a collective good, 
permitting humans to hunt larger game and succeed in 
between-species competition as well as developing techno-
logies allowing survival in otherwise marginal environments. 
Language (a collective good) creates within-group solidarity 
that extends the kin model, creating the potential of between-
group alliance against outside groups (e.g., tribal warfare 
uniting otherwise competing bands within each preliterate 
tribe). Such between-group alliance decreases the benefits of 
kin selection but increase the benefits of cooperation if 
groups adhere to certain laws. Laws to sustain cooperation 
either by tit-for-tat or severe punishment can be traced to 
ancient human civilizations. A good example can be found in 
chapter 19 of the book of Deuteronomy in the Old Testament 
governing revenge for murder among the Hebrews. This 
example illustrates the robust benefits of linking kinship with 
group selection if it takes the form of socially accepted rules 
and norms as well as leadership capable of organizing group 
punishment of defectors. Another important contribution of 
language was means to gossip. In fact the need to gossip has 
been argued to be one of the major selective forces for the 
evolution of language [50]. Gossip makes it possible to gain 
information about the behaviour of others without actual 
eavesdropping. Thus, indirect reciprocity, or reputation 
based reciprocity, works better in the presence of language 
than its absence. Indeed, only such processes can explain the 
very large increase in the size of human societies from the 
hunter-gatherer band that characterized thousands of years of 
human evolution and social development leading to the 
modern nation-state (which is a product of the last three 
centuries and hence but a moment in the overall sweep of 
human evolution). 
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